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This paper seeks to establish the magnitude of the long-run motherhood wage 
penalty. Using data from the 1997 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, I examine 
the difference between the real hourly wages of mothers and non-mothers in the long 
run. By comparing mothers to not-yet-mothers as well as never-mothers, I am able to 
better isolate the true wage penalty mothers face. My findings indicate that 21 to 25 
years after the birth of their first child, mothers face a 31.75 percentage point wage 
penalty compared to non-mothers. In addition, I examine differences in the wage 
penalties of mothers by marital status, educational attainment, and race. My results 
suggest that married women face a 7.16 percentage point greater wage penalty than 
single women 20 years after the birth of their first child. I also find that mothers with 
over 16 years of schooling face a penalty twice the size of mothers who completed 12 
or fewer years of schooling. Finally, I find that white mothers face the largest 
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Having children has a persistent negative effect on the wages of mothers. While 
fathers experience a wage premium (Budig 2014), the motherhood wage penalty has 
been found to negatively affect the lifetime earnings of mothers (Miller 2013). The 
percentage of women who have children by the age of 44 increased by six percentage 
points between 2006 and 2016, reaching 86% (Livingston 2018). This means that the 
negative effect of motherhood on wages affects a large majority of women. There are 
several reasons why mothers earn less than non-mothers, but even after controlling for 
a variety of these observable factors, a substantial wage gap still remains. Although the 
motherhood wage gap has declined in recent decades (Pal and Waldfogel 2016; Kwak 
2018), it still poses a sizeable disadvantage for women who choose to become mothers. 
In order to close the gap between the wages of mothers and non-mothers, the long-run 
effect children have on the wages of mothers needs to be examined more closely. 
The motherhood wage penalty has been studied extensively in recent decades. 
Estimates of the motherhood wage penalty have varied a lot depending on the groups 
of mothers being studied. Waldfogel (1997) finds that the severity of the wage penalty 
varies by the number of children a mother has, and estimates a 5% penalty for the first 
child, and 13% for two children or more. Budig and England (2001) find that married 
and divorced women experience greater motherhood wage penalties compared to single 
women. Wilde, Batchelder, and Ellwood (2010) find that mothers with higher levels of 
education experience a greater penalty. Finally, the literature documents differences in 
the motherhood penalty by race. Neumark and Korenman (1992) and Anderson, Binder, 
and Krause (2003) find that black mothers face a smaller penalty than white mothers. 
I use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), to estimate 
the long-run consequences of motherhood on wages. Unlike earlier studies that find 
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only a temporary effect of children on the wages of women (e.g. Angrist and Evans 
1996), I find that there is a long-lasting motherhood wage penalty. While the long-run 
consequences of motherhood have been studied before (Viitanen 2014; Kahn, Garcia-
Manglano, and Bianchi 2014), I am able to use the most recent version of the NLSY 
(the NLSY97, which includes responses from 1997 to 2017) to update some of the 
motherhood penalty estimates from older studies (Anderson, Binder, and Krause 2003). 
Consistent with Kahn, Garcia-Manglano, and Bianchi (2014), I define non-mothers to 
include both never-mothers and not-yet-mothers. This is different from traditional 
approaches that compare mothers to never-mothers or fathers. By including not-yet-
mothers, I am better able to isolate the effect motherhood has on the wages of women. 
Finally, I add to the literature by using this new data to analyze the long-run effect of 
motherhood on wages across various subgroups of mothers defined by marital status, 
education, and race. 
In order to identify the motherhood wage penalty, I employ several approaches. 
First, I create visualizations that compare mothers and non-mothers of the same age 
based on the number of children they have, marital status, education, and race. Second, 
I model the motherhood wage penalty by time elapsed since the birth of their first child, 
from two years before birth to 25 years after, and include a number of controls. I then 
examine in detail the differences in the motherhood wage penalty across marital status 
(single, married, divorced), education (less than 12, 13 to 16 years, over 16 years of 
schooling), and race (black, Hispanic, white). 
This paper finds that the motherhood wage penalty is significant and is still 
present 20 years after the birth of their first child. Women with one to two children are 
greatly affected and earn only 70% of the wages of non-mothers 20 years after the birth 
of their first child. For mothers of three or more children, this value is 60%. The long-
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run effect of motherhood on wages differs significantly by marital status, education, 
and race. Married mothers have a smaller penalty initially (in years -2 to ten), but then 
surpass the penalty of single mothers eleven to 25 years after the birth of their first 
child. When it comes to educational attainment, college-educated mothers face a larger 
wage penalty than mothers who completed up to 12 years of schooling. In fact, between 
eleven to 20 years after birth, mothers with over 16 years of education face a penalty 
twice the size of mothers who completed 12 or fewer years of schooling. The racial 
background of mothers also has a significant effect on their wage penalties. White 
mothers face the largest penalties, followed by Hispanic mothers, with black mothers 
facing the smallest motherhood wage penalty. 
The following section discusses various patterns present in the literature, 
specifically how the motherhood penalty is measured and the differential effect across 
various subgroups of mothers. Section III describes the data and draws attention to 
differences in the motherhood wage penalty by the number of children a mother has, as 
well as differences by marital status, education, and race. Section IV presents the 
empirical strategy and provides detailed results by marital status, levels of education, 
and race. Section V concludes. 
 
II. Literature Review 
Eighty-six percent of American women become mothers (Livingston 2018), so 
the price associated with motherhood affects a substantial percentage of adults. The gap 
in wages between mothers and non-mothers is referred to as the motherhood wage 
penalty. While the motherhood wage penalty has declined over recent decades (Pal and 
Waldfogel 2016; Kwak 2018), despite these changes the gap still persists. There are a 
number of reasons why the motherhood wage penalty might be present. When women 
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have children, they often take time out of the labor force, which leads to a loss of 
experience that can affect wages. In some cases, mothers change jobs in order to have 
more flexible hours or to be closer to home, settling for lower wages in these new jobs. 
Having young children can also lead to lower workplace productivity, which can affect 
hours worked per week and even future workplace advancement. However, even after 
accounting for inherent differences between mothers and non-mothers by examining 
their work experience, hours worked per week, education and age, a substantial part of 
the motherhood wage gap still remains unaccounted for (Gough and Noonan 2013). 
There is extensive academic research on the motherhood wage penalty. Hill 
(1979) was one of the first studies to use actual productivity measures to determine the 
wage penalty caused by children and marriage. Using measures of work experience and 
labor force attachment, she finds that while marriage does not have a significant effect 
on women’s wages, having children does. Hill’s seminal paper influenced countless 
future studies on the motherhood wage penalty in the United States (see, for example, 
Neumark and Korenman 1992, Waldfogel 1997, Budig and England 2001, Anderson, 
Binder, and Krause 2003). While at the time the Panel Study of Income Dynamics was 
an excellent data source (Hill 1979), the majority of the newer studies use the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) to study the effect children have on women’s 
wages (Loughran and Zissimopoulos 2009; Wilde, Batchelder, and Ellwood 2010; 
Miller 2011; Miller 2013; Kahn, Garcia-Manglano, and Bianchi 2014). The individuals 
in the NLSY are a nationally representative sample and are surveyed each year. The 
panel nature of this dataset, as well as the variables present in the NLSY, make it an 
ideal data source for studying the effect of motherhood on wages. 
Most studies find that the motherhood wage penalty ranges between 5 and 10% 
(Neumark and Korenman 1992; Anderson, Binder, and Krause 2003; Budig 2014). 
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However, the severity of the motherhood penalty can vary based on the number of 
children and marital status. Waldfogel (1997) estimates a 5% penalty for the first child 
and 13% for two children or more, with similar results found by Budig and England 
(2001). Kahn, Garcia-Manglano, and Bianchi (2014) study the long-run consequences 
of having children and find that while the wage penalty tends to go away for most 
mothers (confirmed by Angrist and Evans 1996; Chung et al. 2019), mothers with three 
or more children never fully recover. Budig and England (2001) find that married and 
divorced women experience greater motherhood wage penalties compared to those who 
never marry, which is confirmed by Loughran and Zissimopoulos (2009), and Budig 
(2014). More information on the heterogeneity of the motherhood wage penalty in the 
United States can be found in a survey of the literature conducted by Gough and Noonan 
(2013), which also includes many theoretical explanations for the motherhood wage 
penalty that are outside the scope of this paper. Some potential explanations are the 
human capital theory (the effect of time spent out of the labor force on wages), selection 
(the inherent differences between mothers and non-mothers already present before 
childbirth), and job characteristics (mother-friendly jobs with flexible hours and lower 
wages). 
When it comes to how the the motherhood wage penalty varies by education, 
the literature is divided. Wilde, Batchelder, and Ellwood (2010) find that mothers with 
higher levels of education experience a greater motherhood wage penalty. They find 
that this is especially true for high-skilled women who have children early in life. 
Delaying childbirth can lead to a smaller motherhood wage penalty. Women who wait 
longer to have children can obtain higher levels of education or accumulate more work 
experience before childbirth. This allows them to generate a surplus of capital which 
they can spend on childcare services in order to minimize their time out of the labor 
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force. In accordance with this, Miller (2011) finds that women who are more educated 
can reap larger benefits from delaying childbirth. Waldfogel (1997) also finds a larger 
motherhood penalty for more educated women. In contrast, Anderson, Binder, and 
Krause (2003) find that the motherhood penalty is greatest for those who completed 
high school (compared to mothers who did not complete high school or who graduated 
college). They believe this is because high school graduates are most likely to have jobs 
that require their consistent presence and have lower levels of autonomy in their 
occupations than college graduates. 
Finally, there are differences in the motherhood wage penalty by race. Most 
studies agree that black mothers face a smaller motherhood penalty than white mothers 
(Neumark and Korenman 1992; Waldfogel 1997; Anderson, Binder, and Krause 2003). 
While some studies merely note this difference without an explanation, Anderson, 
Binder, and Krause (2003) believe that this difference in past studies (Hill 1979; 
Waldfogel 1997) is due to the group of black women who return to work late and appear 
to avoid the motherhood penalty. While few studies include Hispanics in their analyses 
(primarily due to limited available observations), Budig and England (2001) find that 
the motherhood penalty for Hispanics is smaller than it is for whites. They believe the 
group primarily responsible for this difference are Hispanic mothers with three and 
more children, who experience smaller penalties. 
One key limitation of the existing literature on the motherhood wage penalty is 
the descriptive nature of the studies. Causality is hard to establish, as most researchers 
cannot randomly assign some participants to have children and keep all else constant. 
Fortunately, a few studies using natural experiments are able to isolate the causal effect 
children had on the wages of mothers. Lundborg, Plug, and Rasmussen (2017) study 
the effects of successful versus unsuccessful IVF treatments on the wages of women in 
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Denmark. They find that having a child primarily affects the hourly earnings of mothers 
and not their labor supply. This finding is important, since previous descriptive studies 
have focused a lot on the labor supply of mothers (Angrist and Evans 1996; Jacobsen, 
Pearce, and Rosenbloom 1999). Based on the findings of their causal study, it seems 
that hourly wages are a good indicator for the motherhood penalty in a descriptive 
analysis as well. 
Another important limitation is the duration of most studies. There are still only 
a few studies that look at the long-run implications of having children (Miller 2013; 
Kahn, Garcia-Manglano, and Bianchi 2014). Chung et al. (2019) find that the parental 
earnings gap doubles from two years before birth to the year after a child is born, and 
it continues to grow until the child starts school, at which point the motherhood wage 
penalty once again starts to decline. Lundborg, Plug, and Rasmussen (2017) find that 
the short-term effect of having children on wages is considerably smaller than the 12-
13% wage penalty in the medium- and long-run. Finally, Viitanen (2014) finds that 
even 30 years after the birth of their first child, there is still a wage gap between mothers 
and non-mothers. This paper adds to the existing literature by examining the long-run 
motherhood wage penalty from two years before to 20 years after the birth of their first 
child. 
This paper adds to the existing literature in other ways as well. Most papers 
focus on the wage gap between mothers and fathers (Sigle-Rushton and Waldfogel 
2007; Budig 2014; Weeden, Cha, and Bucca 2016; Chung et al. 2019) or between 
mothers and never-mothers (Waldfogel 1997; Lundberg and Rose 2000; Budig and 
England 2001; Anderson, Binder, and Krause 2003; Chalmers and Hill 2007; Kwak 
2018). In contrast, I compare the wages of mothers to the wages of never-mothers and 
not-yet-mothers. The only study that isolates the motherhood penalty in this way is 
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Kahn, Garcia-Manglano, and Bianchi (2014). This definition of non-mothers allows for 
a better comparison, as there are several inherent differences between women who have 
children and women who never have children. It helps control for the effect selection 
into motherhood can have on the estimated motherhood penalty (Gough and Noonan 
2013). The panel nature of the NLSY allows for the inclusion of woman-year 
observations for a given individual in two categories: initially she is part of the control 
group as a not-yet-mother, this way she can be compared to those who have already 
had a child at her age. However, once she has a child of her own, she seamlessly 
becomes part of the mother group and is no longer considered a non-mother. 
Furthermore, I add to the literature in addition to the findings of Kahn, Garcia-
Manglano, and Bianchi (2014) by using the most recent version of the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth. The NLSY97 survey data covers individuals born 
between 1980-1984. Most previous studies, including Kahn, Garcia-Manglano, and 
Bianchi (2014), worked with older versions of the survey (Neumark and Korenman 
1992; Loughran and Zissimopoulos 2009; Miller 2011). This dataset allows me to study 
the long-run effect of children better, as there are 18 waves of the current survey, while 
most previous studies only had access to 15 waves (Waldfogel 1997; Anderson, Binder, 
and Krause 2003). Finally, while Chung et al. (2019) have examined the long-run 
parental earnings gap by marital status, education, and race, I add to the literature by 
estimating the long-run motherhood wage penalty by these same categories. 
 
III. Data 
I use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, specifically the 1997 
cohort (NLSY97). This longitudinal panel dataset compiled by the U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics is ideal for my purposes because it has detailed information on the 
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children of participants (including their birth dates and residency status) and 
employment (hourly wages, hours worked per week, actual experience, and job codes), 
as well as detailed demographic information (age, region, and several measures of 
educational attainment). The NLSY97 cohort was born between 1980-1984 and was 
surveyed 18 times, with their most recent survey round occurring in 2017-2018 (U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics 2020). 
The panel nature of the NLSY97 dataset also permits meaningful long-run 
comparisons between various groups of mothers. My sample is restricted to women 
who have reported positive hourly wages, and are not missing values for overall health 
status, region, hours worked per week, job codes, marital status, and number of 
biological children. I do not restrict my sample to only married women, as in Ermisch 
and Wright (1993); Jacobsen, Pearce, and Rosenbloom (1999); and Lundberg and Rose 
(2000), and instead choose to include married and unmarried women following the 
approach used by Neumark and Korenman (1992); Waldfogel (1997); Budig and 
England (2001); and others. The sample is also not restricted to those who have 
complete educational information. This is due to the panel nature of the data, as well as 
the fact that the NLSY97 reports several educational measures allowing me to piece 
together each respondent’s cumulative educational attainment in years. 
Finally, the sample is restricted to those who earn between $1 and $250 per hour 
in 2020 dollars following Budig and England (2001), who used $200 as an upper limit 
in 2001 dollars. This restriction is important because hourly wages is the variable used 
to establish the long-run motherhood wage penalty. As the primary outcome variable, 
real hourly wages are also used to compare the magnitudes of the long-run wage 
penalties across groups of mothers. Using a pooled-cross section of the NLSY97 allows 
me to drop observations with no earnings or wages less than $1 without removing an 
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individual entirely from the sample. This is important, because those more severely 
affected by motherhood are more likely to be earning nothing than those who are less 
affected. The changes in the composition of the sample resulting from these restrictions 
can be seen in Table 1. Cumulatively, these restrictions result in a final sample size of 
50,524 women-year observations for 4,295 women. The women remaining in the 
sample were surveyed in up to 18 waves of the NLSY97, on average 13.4 times. 
3.1 Variable Definitions 
The most important variable when it comes to measuring the motherhood wage 
penalty is real hourly wages. These are measured by taking the hourly wages present in 
the NLSY97 and adjusting them to 2020 dollars using the BLS CPI Inflation Calculator 
(U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2019). As mentioned before in the restrictions section, 
real hourly wages range from $1 to $250. One key limitation of this paper is that wages 
are only observed for those who (choose to) work. This could lead to selection bias, as 
I do not analyze individuals with no reported wages. However, it is important to note 
that the pooled nature of the data increases the likelihood of observing wages earned 
by these individuals if at any point during the survey period they are earning wages 
(Waldfogel 1997). 
Other variables present are demographic variables including age, as well as 
indicator variables I created using the NLSY97 for: race (black, Hispanic, mixed (non-
Hispanic), white (non-black/non-Hispanic)), region (Northeast, Midwest, South, West), 
marital status (single; married; divorced, separated, or widowed), respondent’s self-
reported overall health (a 5-point scale ranging from excellent to poor), as well as 
indicator variables for each survey year. I also include the census occupation codes (as 
indicator variables), and hours worked per week. While the NLSY97 does provide 
hours worked per week, I created six indicator variables for hours worked: under ten 
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hours, 10-19, 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, and over 50. In order to count the number of 
biological children a respondent has, I add up the two measures for biological children 
present in the NLSY97 (either part of the household or nonresident). Following this I 
create four indicator variables for number of children: zero, one, two, and three or more. 
I also include actual labor market experience by using the weeks worked 
variable in the NLSY and only counting years where an individual was employed for 
six or more weeks, following Budig and England (2001). Finally, I attempt to identify 
the number of school years each individual has completed as an additional control 
variable. This process was difficult due to the contradictions present in the NLSY97 
schooling data. One important limitation of the data is that approximately 5-10% of the 
respondent-year schooling observations had either missing values or contradictions. 
However, since schooling will only be used as three indicator variables (up to 12 years, 
13-16 years, over 16 years), I attempt to fill in the missing values with a valid schooling 
year by examining the years before and after the missing data point. Since no single 
measure of schooling is even close to being universally present in the NLSY97, the 
variable I construct comes as close as possible to identifying how much time individuals 
spent on their education. 
3.2 Comparing Mothers and Non-mothers 
To identify the long-run motherhood wage penalty, I compare the wages of 
mothers to the wages of non-mothers of the same age. Throughout the paper when I 
refer to mothers, I mean women who have at least one biological child. While some 
studies use mothers and never-mothers (Budig and England 2001; Anderson, Binder, 
and Krause 2003), I believe there might be inherent differences between mothers and 
never-mothers that affect the motherhood wage penalty. For this reason, I follow Kahn, 
Garcia-Manglano, and Bianchi (2014) in comparing mothers to all other women of the 
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same age, including never-mothers and those who might become mothers in the future 
(not-yet-mothers). The nature of the dataset facilitates this identification, because each 
woman is present not only as an individual with a unique youth ID, but as several 
woman-year observations. This way a woman can be considered a non-mother during 
the earlier survey years, and then seamlessly transition to being considered a mother. 
To facilitate this goal and to identify mothers, I create variables for motherhood 
status and time since first child’s birth. To correctly identify the motherhood status of 
an observation, I create three indicator variables for mother, never-mother, and not-yet-
mother. The mother variable is equal to 1 if the woman-year observation has at least 
one biological child and 0 if not. The never-mother variable is equal to 1 if the woman 
will never have a child, and the not-yet-mother variable is equal to 1 if the woman will 
later become a mother. Using the detailed information present in the NLSY97, I am 
able to identify the birth year of every first child and use it to create a variable that 
counts the number of years that have passed since the birth of a respondent’s first child. 
I create indicator variables for each year, ranging from two years before the child is 
born to 25 years after. 
There are 20,432 woman-year observations that are mothers, and 30,092 that 
are non-mothers. Table 2 shows how these two groups differ across various key 
variables. It is important to note that since my definition of non-mothers is different 
from most of the literature, the mean values for mothers versus non-mothers are also 
different than what we would expect from the literature (Waldfogel 1997; Budig and 
England 2001; Anderson, Binder, and Krause 2003). Mothers earn $1.43 more in real 
hourly wages than non-mothers, which can seem surprising at first. However, I have 
not yet controlled for age, marital status, actual experience, and several other variables. 
Mothers are 4.87 years older and are more likely to be married (and divorced, separated, 
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or widowed) than non-mothers, out of whom 78% are single. Mothers are also more 
likely to be black (34% compared to 21% for non-mothers) and Hispanic (24% 
compared to 18% for non-mothers), and less likely to be white (40% compared to 60% 
of non-mothers). Mothers also have better overall health, are less likely to be enrolled 
in school, have 3.65 more years of actual labor force experience, and work 4.57 more 
hours per week than non-mothers. 
In order to explain some of the surprising results of Table 2, I provide a 
summary of the same variables for never-mothers and not-yet-mothers separately, to 
better understand the composition of non-mothers. Table 3 shows that never-mothers 
make $1.92 more than not-yet-mothers, are 2.78 years older, and are more likely to be 
single. Never-mothers work 1.39 more hours per week than not-yet-mothers and have 
on average 2.36 years of additional experience. Because not-yet-mothers are younger, 
have less experience, and work fewer hours per week, it makes sense that their hourly 
wages are lower. Thus, including not-yet-mothers in the non-mother group not only 
lowers the wages of non-mothers compared to mothers, but not including them in the 
mother category also increases the wages of mothers. If I had followed older papers 
that compare mothers to never-mothers, I would have included not-yet-mothers in the 
mother category, and that would have led to never-mothers having higher wages than 
mothers. However, with the specifications present in this paper, the means presented in 
Table 2 and Table 3 seem reasonable. It is important to note that these differences 
merely help to contextualize the motherhood wage penalty. In the remainder of this 
section I focus on the wage penalty mothers face. 
3.3 Differences in the Motherhood Wage Penalty 
I create a wage penalty variable by generating the mean hourly wages of non-
mothers at each age (from age 16 to 38), and then subtracting the hourly wages of each 
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individual mother from the mean hourly wages of non-mothers of the same age. To 
create the wage penalty variable by time since first child, I then take the means of these 
differences based on time since first child. The results of this calculation can be seen in 
Table 4. There is actually a wage premium in the year of childbirth, as well as one year 
after, but starting at year 2, the wage penalty continues to increase as more time elapses 
since mothers had their first child. These values line up well with one of the few natural 
experiments in the field that was able to establish causality, conducted by Lundborg, 
Plug, and Rasmussen (2017). In their study they also find an initial motherhood 
premium in years 0 and 1, which they then find becomes a penalty in years 2 to 10. 
I create further variables for the wage gap between mothers and non-mothers of 
the same age. Using a process similar to the one mentioned above, I divide the wages 
of mothers at each age by the mean hourly wages of non-mothers of the same age. This 
allows me to compare similar groups of women in order to better establish the negative 
effect motherhood had on them. Figure 1 shows the effect that various numbers of 
children have on the wages of mothers. A solid line represents women with a single 
child, the dashed line represents two children, and the dotted line indicates three or 
more children. In each case, the x-axis shows the time elapsed since the birth of their 
first child. The y-axis shows the ratio of the wages of mothers to non-mothers of the 
same age, with 1 representing no motherhood wage penalty. There is a clear downward 
trend among all groups, which starts at birth. All three groups of mothers earn less than 
their non-mother counterparts starting at birth, and mothers never fully recover. This is 
especially the case for mothers with three or more children, who have lower wages than 
those with fewer children. Mothers with one to two children follow similar trajectories, 
and both end up at 70% of the wages of non-mothers 20 years after the birth of their 
first child. Women with three or more children are more likely to leave the labor force 
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for a longer amount of time or give up on having a job entirely. In contrast, mothers 
with fewer children arguably spend less time caring for their children, spend less money 
on childcare, and due to these reasons can likely reenter the labor force sooner. This 
may help explain why there is a smaller wage penalty for mothers with fewer children. 
One important thing to keep in mind when examining Figure 1 is the 
comparison group for mothers when establishing the wage gap variable. The wage gap 
is measured as the ratio of the real hourly wage of mothers at a given age to never-
mothers and not-yet-mothers of that same age. This means that the average wages of 
non-mothers come closer and closer to never-mothers as the age of women increases. 
This is due to the fact that not-yet-mothers become mothers eventually, leaving only 
the never-mothers in the non-mother group towards the end of the age distribution. 
Kahn, Garcia-Manglano, and Bianchi (2014) also acknowledge the changing nature of 
the comparison group, but this measure is still a more accurate comparison between 
similar groups than the conventional methods. Let me present an example to illustrate 
this point: there are fewer inherent differences between a 26-year-old mother and a 26-
year-old not-yet-mother (who will give birth at age 28), than there would be between a 
26-year-old mother and 26-year-old never-mother (who will never have children due 
to a variety of reasons). 
3.4 Motherhood Wage Penalty by Marital Status, Educational Attainment, and Race 
Several papers also examine the differential effect of motherhood by marital 
status (Neumark and Korenman 1992; Budig and England 2001; Gough and Noonan 
2013). Figure 2 shows the effect of motherhood on women by marital status. A solid 
line represents single women, the dashed line represents married women, and the dotted 
line indicates divorced, separated, or widowed women. There is a clear wage premium 
for married women in the first four years after the birth of their first child. After the 
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fourth year, their wages start to decline rapidly, and they join the other two groups at 
70% of non-mother wages 20 years after the birth of their first child. Single and 
divorced women follow similar trajectories, with the difference being that single 
women start at a higher percentage of non-mother wages at birth. Figure 2 supports 
theories present in the literature that marital status does affect the motherhood penalty, 
especially in studies focusing on the short-run outcomes, but also provides support for 
papers that claim there is no difference between groups, as we can see only minimal 
differences after year 9. 
Along similar lines, Figure 3 shows that years of schooling greatly affects the 
motherhood wage penalty. Compared to non-mothers of their own age with the same 
level of education, those who complete over 16 years of schooling seem to have a 
motherhood premium until nine years after the birth of their first child (dotted line). 
Even after ten years, they still face the smallest penalty compared to the other two 
groups. Those who went to college (completed 13-16 years of schooling, dashed line) 
are in the middle, and while they start off with a wage premium, after year 2 they earn 
less than non-mothers. They then have a consistent decrease until year 20. High-school-
educated mothers (up to 12 years, solid line) have the largest wage penalty compared 
to non-mothers who completed the same amount of schooling. Their decline parallels 
that of college-educated mothers and ends at around 70% of the wages of high-school-
educated non-mothers. 
Finally, Figure 4 examines the motherhood wage penalty by race. There is a 
strong downward trend across all three groups: black mothers (solid line), Hispanic 
mothers (dashed line), and white mothers (dotted line). While initially it looks like 
white mothers have a smaller penalty, by years 8 to 14 years after the birth of their first 
child they are at the same level as the other two groups, and after 15 years they are at 
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the lowest level. It seems that Hispanic mothers face the smallest change in penalties 
overall, as they suffer the second lowest penalty initially and the smallest penalty after 
year 15. Black mothers consistently face the greatest wage penalties until year 12. 
 
IV. Empirical Strategy and Results 
4.1 Motherhood Wage Penalty Model 
In order to formally estimate the effect of motherhood on hourly wages, I 
estimate a model of the following form: 
  𝐿𝑛(𝑌!") = 	𝛽# + 𝛾" +	𝛽$𝑋!" + ∑ 𝐶!"% 	𝛿%%%&'( +	𝜀!"   (1) 
where Y is a measure of the natural log of real hourly wages, 𝛾"	is year fixed-effects, 
and X is a vector of personal characteristics (defined in detail below). 𝐶!"%  = 1 if, in 
period t, woman i had a child k periods earlier (or, if k is negative, woman i will have a 
child -k years later). 𝐶!"% , and k (ranging from -2 to 25) jointly represent the event of 
having a first child, including the time elapsed since. The omitted category is more than 
two years prior to birth following Chung et al. (2019). 	𝛿% is the effect of having a child 
on a woman’s hourly wages k years after her first child was born. Finally, ε is an error 
term with the usual properties. 
It can be seen from Section III that the motherhood wage penalty increases in 
magnitude as the years pass since the birth of their first child. Equation 1 attempts to 
focus on the effect of the event of childbirth on the wages of mothers by including a 
variety of controls. Table 5 shows the results from equation 1 successively adding 
personal characteristics in the X vector. Specifically, Column 1 includes controls for 
marital status, race, and self-reported health, as well as year fixed effects. Column 2 
adds an additional control, hours worked per week, to the model in Column 1. Hours 
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worked per week are present in the form of six indicator variables: less than ten hours, 
10-19, 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, and over 50 hours. Including hours worked per week in the 
regression model decreases the wage premium of married women. Column 3 further 
adds an indicator variable for current educational enrollment, which does not change 
the model noticeably. 
Column 4 includes all previous control variables, as well as a quadratic in actual 
experience, which is measured by the number of years an individual has worked six 
weeks or more. The addition of actual experience has only a modest effect on the model, 
which can be due to the fact that year fixed effects and time since child have already 
been included, as well as educational attainment. Finally, Column 5 includes dummy 
variables for the census job codes following Budig and England (2001) in order to 
attempt to control for the self-selection of mothers into mother-friendly or 
predominantly female jobs, which can lead to a wage penalty compared to jobs that are 
typically filled by men. The addition of census job codes has a large effect on how 
much time since first birth affects wages across all categories. For example, 21 to 25 
years after birth, mothers faced a 38.68 percentage point1 wage penalty relative to non-
mothers, and now with the addition of job codes, the motherhood penalty declined to 
31.75 percentage points. In addition, including job codes diminishes the effect of 
marital status on wages. It also decreases the effect of working fewer hours per week, 
while increasing the effect of working more hours. 
Since the results are similar across specifications, I now focus on interpreting 
the results from the most comprehensive model presented in Column 5 of Table 5. As 
 
1 In order to determine the true percentage point penalty on wages, I used the formula ex-1, where x is 
the coefficient. While in general log points can be roughly interpreted as percentage points, in cases 
where the coefficients are large in magnitude, these numbers diverge. For the remainder of this paper 
this calculation is used whenever percentage points are presented. 
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expected, the years before the birth of their first child do not significantly affect the real 
hourly wages of mothers. In contrast, the years following birth all have a statistically 
significant effect on hourly wages. While the effect is small initially, it can be seen from 
the table that the coefficients increase with time since birth. Figure 5 individually plots 
the coefficients of each year since the birth of their first child. While few studies have 
examined the long-run motherhood wage gap, similar long-term effects are found by 
Wilde, Batchelder, and Ellwood (2010), as well as Loughran and Zissimopoulos (2009) 
and by Kahn, Garcia-Manglano, and Bianchi (2014). I now turn to other factors that 
can affect the wages of mothers. 
Marital status affects the hourly wages of women as well, which has been 
documented extensively in the literature (Hill 1979; Loughran and Zissimopoulos 
2009; Budig 2014). Surprisingly, I find a slight premium for married women compared 
to single women, as seen in Column 5 of Table 5. While such a premium has been found 
before (Budig and England 2001), this discrepancy might be due to the methodologies 
used in the literature, which tend to focus on the differences between married mothers 
and single mothers. This can affect the results, as married mothers often earn less than 
single mothers due to them having a partner who is also in the labor force. In the model 
presented in this paper, however, single women can be mothers or non-mothers, and 
married non-mothers are likely to be older and earn more, which could be the main 
reason for the difference. It can also be seen from Column 5 that single women (the 
omitted category) earn more than their divorced or separated counterparts. 
There are further noteworthy patterns in the results. Wages are lower for those 
working fewer hours per week, which is often the case for mothers with small children 
(Lundborg, Plug, and Rasmussen 2017). Those currently enrolled in educational 
institutions earn less, as do those women with bad self-reported health. Finally, it seems 
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that actual experience modestly decreases wages, however, this might be due to the 
inclusion of year fixed effects, time since the first child’s birth, and enrollment status. 
In any case, the effect of actual experience seems negligible after including these other 
controls. 
Taken together, it does seem that there is a motherhood wage penalty that 
increases with the passage of time since the birth of their first child. While this model 
only explains around 40% of the variation in real hourly wages, the implications of 
various factors are significant. However, there are some limitations to this model. By 
only including women with reported hourly wages, it excludes mothers who are not in 
the labor force, which is a significant mechanism by which motherhood affects future 
earnings. I attempt to correct for this bias by including actual experience in the model. 
The remainder of this section focuses on a decomposition of these results, specifically 
the differential effect of motherhood on the wages of women by marital status. Having 
a spouse present affects the labor force decisions of the household and can provide 
mothers with the financial security to stay at home with their children or to choose more 
mother-friendly jobs. These factors could cause married mothers to experience a larger 
penalty compared to single mothers. However, single mothers might not have any 
assistance with childcare, either due to the lack of a spouse or lack of sufficient funds 
to spend on childcare. This situation could lead to diminished work hours or occupation 
changes, and in turn, lower wages. 
Table 6 shows the effect that time since the birth of their first child has on 
mothers by marital status. Column 1 shows these results for all mothers, Column 2 only 
includes single mothers, Column 3 only looks at married mothers, and Column 4 shows 
the results for divorced, separated, or widowed mothers. There is a statistically 
significant effect of time since childbirth on single mothers across all categories. Since 
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single mothers are the largest category, they have a significant effect on the results seen 
for all mothers, so the numerical values in Column 1 and Column 2 are quite similar. 
Looking at married mothers, they have a smaller penalty initially, from two years before 
birth to ten years after, but then surpass the penalty of single mothers from years 11 to 
25 since the birth of their first child. At 21 to 25 years, single mothers have a 27.02 
percentage point penalty compared to non-mothers, while married women have a 34.56 
percentage point penalty. By contrast, divorced mothers have smaller penalties than 
single mothers for all but the last category.  This decomposition shows that some of the 
motherhood wage penalty is due to sample composition, as several studies have only 
looked at married women when estimating the penalty (Ermisch and Wright 1993; 
Jacobsen, Pearce, and Rosenbloom 1999; Lundberg and Rose 2000; Chung et al. 2019), 
while including single mothers can severely affect the overall numerical value of the 
motherhood wage penalty. 
These results provide support for a long-run negative effect of motherhood on 
wages. Mothers are not only earning less in the years immediately after birth but, due 
to a variety of other factors, never fully recover from this wage penalty. 
4.2 Motherhood Wage Penalty by Educational Attainment 
I now turn to examining the motherhood wage penalty by educational 
attainment. Higher educated women are more likely to work in high-skill industries 
where work commitment matters, and in jobs where time off work can severely affect 
their wages (Budig and England 2001). They might also be more likely to have high-
earning spouses, which could lead to highly educated mothers working fewer hours or 
leaving the labor force entirely (Chung et al. 2019). On the one hand, women who only 
completed high school might have lower paying jobs to begin with, or work fewer 
hours, so shifting to more mother-friendly jobs might not cause a large change in wages. 
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On the other hand, mothers with fewer years of schooling might not be able to afford 
childcare services, leading to time spent out of the labor force and lower future wages. 
The literature presents mixed results when it comes to the differential effect of 
motherhood by educational attainment (for more details, see the literature review 
conducted by Gough and Noonan 2013). This stems from studies examining different 
decades of data, studies using different ways to identify the amount of schooling 
mothers have completed, and the overall differences in methodologies across the 
various studies. In order to analyze the patterns found in Figure 3, I now turn to 
examining the regression results in Table 7. Column 1 shows all mothers, while 
Columns 2-4 show mothers who completed up to 12 years of schooling, 13-16 years, 
and over 16 years. Around half (24,639) of mothers only completed up to 12 years of 
schooling, while 20,565 mothers completed 13-16 years of schooling, and only 5,320 
mothers have over 16 years of schooling. 
Table 7 shows that the years -2 to 0 do not have a statistically significant effect 
on wages. This makes sense, since these are the years leading up to childbirth, and 
women have not yet experienced any of the negative effects of having a child. Years 1 
to 5 are significant for mothers with up to 16 years of education, and the penalty is 
greater for mothers who are college-educated. High-school-educated mothers have a 
smaller penalty than college-educated mothers between the years of 1 to 20, after which 
the differences are no longer statistically significant. In cases where the differences are 
significant, mothers with over 16 years of education also face greater penalties than 
high-school-educated mothers. In fact, between years 11 to 20, mothers with over 16 
years of education face a penalty twice the size of mothers who completed 12 or fewer 
years of schooling. These numbers align with results found by Waldfogel (1997) and 
Wilde, Batchelder, and Ellwood (2010), who find a larger penalty for highly educated 
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women. These results show that educational attainment has a large effect on the long-
run wage penalties faced by mothers. 
4.3 Motherhood Wage Penalty by Race 
I now turn to examining the motherhood wage penalty by race. While few 
studies hypothesize about why there might be a difference, it seems that white mothers 
might face larger penalties due to their higher initial wages, while those with lower 
wages might have to give up less when becoming mothers. Since white women tend to 
have higher wages regardless of their marital status, the gap between white mothers and 
white non-mothers might only be numerically larger than the gap between black 
mothers and black non-mothers, and not absolutely. Another possible reason is that 
white women often have higher earning spouses (white men), which can lead them to 
decrease their hours worked and affect their future wages. 
In Table 8, all mothers are shown in Column 1, and Columns 2-4 show the effect 
of time since first child on black, Hispanic, and white mothers. Half of all mothers are 
white, but there are still over 10,000 mother-year observations for the other two groups. 
The first category, years -2 to 0, are not significant below the 1% level for any group, 
while the following years, 1 to 20, are significant for all groups (p < 0.001). Finally, 
years 21 to 25 are significant for all groups but white mothers. Hispanic and white 
mothers have similar penalties except for years 16 to 20, where white mothers face a 
larger penalty. Black mothers seem to have a smaller penalty overall, which is 
interesting considering they had greater penalties in Figure 4. This analysis shows that 
mothers face different penalties by race, and it is important to be aware of sample 
compositions in any study that examines the motherhood wage penalty. 
4.4 Magnitude of the Motherhood Wage Penalty 
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When comparing the magnitude of the motherhood wage penalty found in this 
paper to those found in the literature, it is important to keep in mind that only a few 
studies have examined the long-run effect of motherhood on wages. Neumark and 
Korenman (1992) find a 27% wage gap between mothers with two or more children 
and non-mothers. Kahn, Garcia-Manglano, and Bianchi (2014) find that the wage gap 
disappears for most mothers in the long run, and only remains for mothers with three 
or more children, which is still at least 4% by the time the mothers are 40 to 60 years 
old. Finally, while Lundborg, Plug, and Rasmussen (2017) only have results for six to 
ten years after birth, they find a 12-13% hourly wage penalty for mothers at that time. 
I find that 20 to 25 years after having a child, married mothers experience a 34.56 
percentage point wage penalty compared to non-mothers, while single mothers 
experience a 27.02 percentage point penalty (calculations based on Table 6), which is 
considerably larger than the gaps found by most studies. This difference could be due 
to my definition of non-mothers, since by including not-yet-mothers in the comparison 
group, the group is actually changing over time. As women grow older, more not-yet-
mothers become mothers, which might lead to an overestimation of the motherhood 
wage penalty, especially in the long run. 
Turning to educational attainment, I find that those with over 16 years of 
education experience the highest motherhood wage penalty measured at 16 to 20 years 
after the birth of their first child, at 19.27 percentage points, while college-educated 
mothers experience a 15.38 percentage point wage penalty, and those with up to 12 
years of education face a smaller penalty of 9.70 percentage points (Table 7). These 
results are similar in magnitude to Wilde, Batchelder, and Ellwood (2010), who find 
that a decade after the birth of their first child high-skill women face a 24% penalty. 
Finally, looking at the effect of race on the motherhood penalty, it seems that 16 to 20 
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years after having a child, white mothers face the largest wage penalty at 34.56 
percentage points. Hispanic mothers experience a penalty around half that size, at 19.59 
percentage points, and black mothers only experience a 14.44 percentage point penalty 
(Table 8). Unfortunately, the existing literature pays little attention to the racial gap in 
the motherhood penalty, and there are no papers I am aware of that study the long-run 
motherhood wage penalty by this metric. 
It is important to remember that the motherhood wage penalty estimates in this 
paper are merely descriptive and not causal. It is possible that women with lower wages 
are more likely to become mothers. Similarly, women who experience a wage hit due 
to other reasons are also more likely to consider having a child due to their lower wages. 
None of the estimates in this paper are able to account for this form of endogeneity. If 
women with lower wages are more likely to become mothers, this could mean that my 
results overestimate the motherhood wage penalty. 
 
V. Conclusion 
Estimates of the motherhood wage penalty in the existing literature have varied 
greatly depending on sample composition, methodology, and the year various studies 
were conducted. There has also been disagreement in the literature on whether or not 
the motherhood penalty persists in the long run, and how it differs by maternal marital 
status, education, and race. In order to address these limitations, this paper reestimates 
the motherhood wage penalty using recent data and focuses on time since the birth of a 
first child as a key metric for how the effect of motherhood on wages changes over 
time. To better isolate the effect of children on women, I follow Kahn, Garcia-
Manglano, and Bianchi (2014) in comparing mothers to never-mothers and not-yet-
mothers. This helps to control for inherent differences between women who choose to 
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have children and women who decide not to. Using the NLSY97, and consistent 
methodology, I can meaningfully assess the differential long-run effect of motherhood 
on the hourly wages of women by marital status, education, and race. 
I find that the motherhood wage penalty is substantial and long-lasting. In the 
first five years after the birth of their first child mothers experience a 6.06 percentage 
point penalty; however, by 20 to 25 years after birth the gap between mothers and non-
mothers increases to 31.75 percentage points. Examining the differences by marital 
status, I find that while married mothers have a smaller initial wage penalty, from 
eleven to 25 years after birth they experience greater penalties than single mothers, 
consistent with findings in the literature. This may be due to the specialization of labor 
in the household, which can result in mothers taking more time off work or switching 
to lower paying jobs with added flexibility. When comparing the motherhood wage 
penalty by educational attainment, I find that mothers who completed up to 12 years of 
schooling face smaller penalties than more-educated mothers. One potential reason 
behind more-educated women having a greater penalty is their higher opportunity cost. 
Well-educated women are often in higher paying jobs, so taking time off work to raise 
children could affect their wage trajectory compared to women who never have 
children. In contrast, women who did not complete their high school education might 
have lower wages or could already be employed in more mother-friendly jobs. Finally, 
this paper finds that white mothers face the largest wage penalties, followed by 
Hispanic mothers, and black mothers face the smallest motherhood wage penalty, 
which is consistent with findings present in the literature. 
A key limitation of this paper is the positive selection of women into the labor 
force. Since wages are only observed for women who choose to work, women who 
might be the most affected by having a child might not be in the sample. However, the 
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panel nature of the NLSY97 has the benefit of only dropping woman-year observations 
with missing wages, as opposed to completely removing individuals from the sample. 
This increases the chances of observing the wages of any one woman. Another 
limitation is that white mothers, as well as mothers with greater educational attainment, 
have higher initial wages, which means they might only have larger wage gaps 
numerically. The initial differences in wages by education and race might cause the 
motherhood wage penalties of these groups to be overstated. One final limitation is the 
changing nature of the control group. Since non-mothers are defined as never-mothers 
and not-yet-mothers, as women get older, more not-yet-mothers become mothers, so 
the control group becomes more and more like never-mothers, which might overstate 
the effect motherhood has on wages, especially in later years. That being said, the effect 
is so significant that I can safely say there is a definite long-run effect of motherhood 
on wages. 
Future research needs to focus on looking back at the results present in the 
literature and updating them with more recent data. While there are only 18 waves of 
the NLSY97 available at the present time, in the upcoming years this dataset will 
continue to grow and can be used to study the long-run consequences of motherhood. 
Further extensions to this paper could also use different variables of interest, for 
example part-time hourly wages or hours worked per week, or could perform a deeper 
analysis on how the jobs mothers choose can affect the motherhood wage penalty. 
Finally, more research needs to be done on the exact groups affected by the motherhood 
wage penalty in order to create policies that mitigate these negative consequences of 
childbirth. If the United States wants to reverse the current trend in fertility rates, the 
motherhood wage penalty needs to be at the forefront of policies aimed at eliminating 
the gender wage gap.  
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Appendix 
Table 1. Sample Restrictions 
Sample 1 Responses Observations 
All respondents 8,984 161,712 
Just women 4,385 78,930 
Nonmissing hourly wages, real hourly wages over $0 4,301 51,842 
Nonmissing health, region, hours worked per week, 
and census occupation code 
4,295 50,912 
Nonmissing marital status 4,295 50,795 
Real hourly pay >$1 and <$250 4,295 50,586 
Nonmissing information on biological children 4,295 50,524 




Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations 
Variable Mothers Non-mothers 








Race/ethnicity   
















Marital status:   




























Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, stars indicate that the means of mothers are significantly 
different from the means of non-mothers 
+1: excellent, 2: very good, 3: good, 4: fair, 5: poor 
++1 if enrolled, 0 if not 
Source: NLSY97.  
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Table 3. Means and Standard Deviations within Non-mothers 
Variable Never-mothers Not-yet-mothers 








Race/ethnicity+   
















Marital status:   




























Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, stars indicate that the means of never-mothers are 
significantly different from the means of not-yet-mothers 
+1: excellent, 2: very good, 3: good, 4: fair, 5: poor 
++1 if enrolled, 0 if not 
Source: NLSY97.  
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Table 4. The Long-run Motherhood Wage Penalty 











































t=14 16.30 8.15 
t=15 15.94 9.10 
t=16 16.02 9.24 
t=17 16.86 8.74 
t=18 16.08 9.72 
t=19 16.85 9.37 
t=20 16.36 9.88 
Source: NLSY97. 
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Table 5. Effects of Motherhood on Real Hourly Wages 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
Years since birth     
       -2 to 0 -0.00713 -0.0170* -0.0201** -0.0197** -0.0121 
 (0.00709) (0.00703) (0.00712) (0.00712) (0.00645) 
       1-5 -0.0929*** -0.0958*** -0.0990*** -0.0981*** -0.0625*** 
 (0.00661) (0.00650) (0.00663) (0.00663) (0.00598) 
       6-10 -0.217*** -0.208*** -0.211*** -0.209*** -0.138*** 
 (0.00842) (0.00825) (0.00830) (0.00831) (0.00761) 
       11-15 -0.336*** -0.321*** -0.322*** -0.319*** -0.221*** 
 (0.0114) (0.0112) (0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0103) 
       16-20 -0.430*** -0.414*** -0.416*** -0.411*** -0.291*** 
 (0.0200) (0.0197) (0.0197) (0.0197) (0.0178) 
       21-25 -0.520*** -0.497*** -0.499*** -0.489*** -0.382*** 
 (0.0830) (0.0827) (0.0828) (0.0829) (0.0685) 
Marital status      
       Married 0.136*** 0.124*** 0.123*** 0.122*** 0.0783*** 
 (0.00630) (0.00619) (0.00619) (0.00619) (0.00559) 
       Divorced+ -0.0152 -0.0238* -0.0238* -0.0240* -0.0211* 
 (0.0119) (0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0103) 
Race Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Health      
       Very good -0.0231*** -0.0230*** -0.0232*** -0.0231*** -0.0165** 
 (0.00575) (0.00563) (0.00563) (0.00563) (0.00509) 
       Good -0.0862*** -0.0869*** -0.0877*** -0.0875*** -0.0604*** 
 (0.00593) (0.00581) (0.00582) (0.00581) (0.00530) 
       Fair -0.160*** -0.159*** -0.160*** -0.160*** -0.111*** 
 (0.00914) (0.00902) (0.00902) (0.00902) (0.00838) 
       Poor -0.217*** -0.207*** -0.209*** -0.208*** -0.163*** 
 (0.0258) (0.0259) (0.0259) (0.0260) (0.0233) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Hours worked per week    
       10-19  -0.189*** -0.189*** -0.188*** -0.156*** 
  (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0117) 
       20-29  -0.219*** -0.220*** -0.219*** -0.192*** 
  (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0113) 
       30-39  -0.134*** -0.137*** -0.137*** -0.145*** 
  (0.0119) (0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0115) 
       40-49  0.0311** 0.0272* 0.0276* -0.0339** 
  (0.0115) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0114) 
       Over 50  0.0100 0.00604 0.00569 -0.0651*** 
  (0.0168) (0.0170) (0.0170) (0.0164) 
Enrollment   -0.0162** -0.0162** -0.0426*** 
   (0.00548) (0.00548) (0.00497) 
Actual experience  -0.00702* -0.00812** 
    (0.00276) (0.00248) 
Actual experience squared Yes Yes 
Job code     Yes 
Constant 2.096*** 2.228*** 2.245*** 2.246*** 2.347*** 
 (0.0138) (0.0167) (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0183) 
Observations 50,524 50,524 50,524 50,524 50,524 
R squared 0.223 0.256 0.256 0.257 0.390 
Adjusted R2 0.223 0.255 0.256 0.256 0.389 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
+Divorced, separated, widowed 
Source: NLSY97.  
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Table 6. Wage Effects of Time Since First Child by Marital Status 
   Marital status  
 All mothers Single Married Divorced+ 
Years since birth   
      -2 to 0 0.00525 -0.0407*** 0.0361* -0.0241 
 (0.00646) (0.00748) (0.0142) (0.0417) 
     
       1-5 -0.0426*** -0.0719*** -0.0399*** -0.0676* 
 (0.00590) (0.00713) (0.0119) (0.0298) 
     
       6-10 -0.123*** -0.136*** -0.133*** -0.109*** 
 (0.00755) (0.00964) (0.0141) (0.0291) 
     
       11-15 -0.212*** -0.195*** -0.244*** -0.165*** 
 (0.0102) (0.0138) (0.0180) (0.0318) 
     
       16-20 -0.284*** -0.246*** -0.342*** -0.161** 
 (0.0178) (0.0225) (0.0316) (0.0510) 
     
       21-25 -0.368*** -0.315*** -0.424** -0.364*** 
 (0.0687) (0.0656) (0.140) (0.0881) 
     
Observations 50,524 33,872 11,837 2,522 
R squared 0.387 0.353 0.382 0.398 
Adjusted R2 0.386 0.352 0.378 0.382 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
+Divorced, separated, widowed 
Notes: In addition to variables shown above, models also include controls for race, health, hours 
worked per week, enrollment, a quadratic for actual experience, census job codes, and indicator 




Table 7. Wage Effects of Time Since First Child by Education 
   Education  
 All mothers Up to 12 years 13-16 years Over 16 years 
Years since 
birth 
   
      -2 to 0 -0.0121 -0.00772 -0.0235* 0.0430 
 (0.00645) (0.00816) (0.0108) (0.0227) 
     
       1-5 -0.0625*** -0.0363*** -0.0540*** 0.0481* 
 (0.00598) (0.00808) (0.00953) (0.0206) 
     
       6-10 -0.138*** -0.0504*** -0.0955*** -0.0434 
 (0.00761) (0.0110) (0.0116) (0.0267) 
     
       11-15 -0.221*** -0.0678*** -0.140*** -0.118*** 
 (0.0103) (0.0149) (0.0156) (0.0344) 
     
       16-20 -0.291*** -0.102*** -0.167*** -0.214*** 
 (0.0178) (0.0258) (0.0274) (0.0610) 
     
       21-25 -0.382*** -0.202* -0.141 -0.398 
 (0.0685) (0.0910) (0.122) (0.209) 
     
Observations 50,524 24,639 20,565 5,320 
R squared 0.390 0.226 0.355 0.361 
Adjusted R2 0.389 0.224 0.353 0.353 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Notes: In addition to variables shown above, models also include controls for race, marital 
status, health, hours worked per week, enrollment, a quadratic for actual experience, census job 




Table 8. Wage Effects of Time Since First Child by Race 
   Race/ethnicity  
 All mothers Black Hispanic White 
Years since 
birth 
   
      -2 to 0 -0.0157* 0.00193 -0.0160 -0.0195* 
 (0.00643) (0.0115) (0.0136) (0.00944) 
     
       1-5 -0.0686*** -0.0343*** -0.0711*** -0.0711*** 
 (0.00587) (0.00986) (0.0116) (0.00958) 
     
       6-10 -0.145*** -0.0809*** -0.157*** -0.154*** 
 (0.00750) (0.0124) (0.0143) (0.0129) 
     
       11-15 -0.230*** -0.128*** -0.214*** -0.264*** 
 (0.0101) (0.0159) (0.0193) (0.0186) 
     
       16-20 -0.301*** -0.156*** -0.218*** -0.424*** 
 (0.0176) (0.0229) (0.0310) (0.0421) 
     
       21-25 -0.399*** -0.241*** -0.420*** -0.420 
 (0.0684) (0.0537) (0.0577) (0.270) 
     
Observations 50,524 13,463 10,419 26,188 
R squared 0.389 0.324 0.371 0.433 
Adjusted. R2 0.388 0.320 0.367 0.431 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Notes: In addition to variables shown above, models also include controls for marital status, 
health, hours worked per week, enrollment, a quadratic for actual experience, census job codes, 

















Figure 3. Wage Gap Between Mothers and Non-mothers by Education 
 










Figure 5. Effect of Motherhood on Wages Over Time 
 
Source: NLSY97. 
